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Abstract: Globalisation and modernisation were expected to transform the Middle East, by 
ending regional conflicts and spreading democracy, freedom, prosperity and peace. However, the 
oil reserves of the Gulf have been the main stake in Western policies that led to wars, not only to 
benefit the hegemon, but also the health of the world capitalist economy. Instead of democracy 
and prosperity, neoliberalism has fostered inequality, unemployment, poverty, mass migration 
and terrorism. Globalisation makes security interdependent; terrorism, gun crime and illegal 
migration are spill over effects of structural, political and economic insecurity. Iraq today shows 
how globalisation incites rebellion and radicalisation. The advancement of the neoliberal agenda 
by industrialised states through globalisation has failed to deliver the economic stability and 
growth it promised. Through a process of macro-securitisation, relationships, agendas and secu-
rity dynamics have been consolidated. Globalisation coupled with a universalist narrative have 
constructed a neoliberal system of economic and ideological dominance, with clearly defined 
threats to it, regionally and globally. It is those security threats the War on Terror was designed 
to fight and eliminate, through the neoliberal, universalist narrative of a hegemonic social, po-
litical and economic culture. Thus was achieved the implementation of policies and procedures, 
ideas and cultures, that promote the structures and ideologies that will maintain hegemony.
Keywords: Iraq, neoliberalism, globalisation, security, casualties.
Introduction
On January 2, 2020, a US airstrike killed a high-profile commander of Iran’s secretive Quds 
Force, Qassim Suleimani, a commander of Iran’s military forces in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and else-
where in the Middle East. Another man, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, deputy of the militias known as 
the Popular Mobilization Units and a close adviser to Suleimani, was also killed in the airstrike 
near Baghdad’s airport. Al-Muhandis and Suleimani were killed when their vehicle was hit on the 
road to the airport. The Popular Mobilization had been fighting Islamic State forces alongside 
Iraqi government forces for years, and had increasingly come under attack themselves, with 
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dozens of their fighters losing their lives in Iraq every year. Three days before the assassination 
of Al-Muhandis and Suleimani, 25 Popular Mobilization fighters had been killed by a US airstrike 
in Western Anbar. Al-Baghdadiya (30.12.2019) reported the mass killing:
The Popular Mobilization Directorate announced, on Monday, the outcome of the American 
bombing of the crowd camp, which rose to 25 dead and 51 wounded. “The death toll from the 
martyrs and the wounded as a result of the American aggression that targeted the locations of 
the Popular Mobilization Forces in western Anbar is 25 dead and 51 wounded,” Rabiawi said 
in a statement to the Popular Mobilization website. He added, “The number of martyrs can be 
increased due to the presence of wounded people in critical condition and severe injuries.”
Suleimani’s Quds Force was a division of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, widely believed to sup-
port many Iran-backed terrorist groups, such as Hezbollah. “This strike was aimed at deterring 
future Iranian attack plans,” the Defense Department said in its statement. “The United States 
will continue to take all necessary action to protect our people and our interests wherever they 
are around the world.”
What are those interests? And what has their protection meant for Iraqis?
Iraq 2019: Security in context
After nearly two decades of war, Iraq has experienced its least violent year: 17 years after 
the invasion, during 2019 2,392 civilian deaths were recorded by Iraq Body Count. In its worst 
year, 2006, Iraq had witnessed the violent deaths of more than 29,500 civilians. However, the 
monthly and yearly totals, assembled after the painstaking daily task of extracting the data from 
hundreds of reports, betray the true magnitude and impact of the war on Iraqi civilians.
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
2003 3 2 3977 3438 545 597 646 833 566 515 487 524 12,133
2004 610 663 1004 1303 655 910 834 878 1042 1033 1676 1129 11,737
2005 1222 1297 905 1145 1396 1347 1536 2352 1444 1311 1487 1141 16,583
2006 1546 1579 1957 1805 2279 2594 3298 2865 2567 3041 3095 2900 29,526
2007 3035 2680 2728 2573 2854 2219 2702 2483 1391 1326 1124 997 26,112
2008 861 1093 1669 1317 915 755 640 704 612 594 540 586 10,286
2009 372 409 438 590 428 564 431 653 352 441 226 478  5,382
2010 267 305 336 385 387 385 488 520 254 315 307 218  4,167
2011 389 254 311 289 381 386 308 401 397 366 288 392  4,162
2012 531 356 377 392 304 529 469 422 400 290 253 299  4,622
2013 357 360 403 545 888 659 1145 1013 1306 1180 870 1126  9,852
2014 1097 972 1029 1037 1100 4088 1580 3340 1474 1738 1436 1327 20,218
2015 1490 1625 1105 2013 1295 1355 1845 1991 1445 1297 1021 1096 17,578
2016 1374 1258 1459 1192 1276 1405 1280 1375 935 1970 1738 1131 16,393
2017 1119 982 1918 1816 1871 1858 1498 597 490 397 346 291 13,183
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2018 474 410 402 303 229 209 230 201 241 305 160 155  3,319
2019 323 271 123 140 166 130 145 93 151 361 274 215  2,392
During 2019 the death toll was lower than any other year, since the invasion. October wit-
nessed the highest toll, with 361 killed; August the lowest, at 93. What demonstrates the nature 
of the security situation in the country though is that, yet again, the killings were almost daily. 
Of the 2,392 civilians killed, 92 were children.
The greatest perpetrators of violence this year were government forces, which killed around 
500 protesters during May, September, October and November. Another 25 protesters were 
massacred by a group of gunmen in Baghdad on December 6th. Airstrikes that killed civilians 
were few, with 9 losing their lives in Turkish and US airstrikes:
January 25th, 4 were killed by Turkish strikes in Dohuk;
March 24th, 1 child was killed by US strikes in Oudan;
September 26th, 1 was killed when Turkish planes struck in Dohuk;
November 4th, 3 more civilians were killed in another Turkish airstrike in Sinjar.
Iraq is still unable or unwilling to provide security and protection to its population from 
threats – internal and external. The vast majority of deaths recorded this year were, as every 
year, direct deaths from conflict violence, that is, deaths that resulted directly from the violent 
actions of participants to the conflict. As in other countries of conflict, conflict parties were 
also involved in criminal activities that caused deaths, for example robberies, kidnappings for 
extortion, or trade in narcotics. The resulting deaths from those were also recorded, as the per-
petrators were committing criminal acts and associated violence in order to finance or otherwise 
support their conflict activities. These criminal activities did not directly further military goals, 
nor were they political violence; however, they were committed in order to advance the conflict 
objectives of the perpetrators. Therefore, these activities were part of the conflict violence and 
evidence that the breakdown in security the conflict caused made those crimes not only possi-
ble, but tragically also very common.
Anti-government protests have erupted on a regular basis in Iraq since 2015. But the pro-
tests of September-December 2019 are the largest and bloodiest since the overthrow of Saddam 
Hussein 16 years ago. For four months, protesters have taken to the streets in Baghdad and 
towns and cities across the south of the country to demand jobs, basic services and an end to 
corruption. Hundreds of young people have been killed and thousands of others wounded in 
clashes with security forces. Many Iraqis are frustrated and desperate that they are without 
clean water and electricity, and there is widespread poverty and high levels of unemployment. 
The young protesters, most of them 15-25 years old, have risen against government corruption, 
lack of opportunity and deprivation, all of which leave them with dismal prospects. Expression 
of a ‘Saddam nostalgia’ is even noticeable among the new generation, under 30 years old, who 
became young adults after the invasion. 
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The BBC (2 December 2019) explained the reasons for the protests as ‘a narrow elite has 
been able to keep a firm grip on power because of a quota system that allocates positions to 
political parties based on sectarian and ethnic identity, encouraging patronage and corruption’, 
and ‘the protesters also angry at Iran’ because … [Iran] ‘has close links to Shia politicians who 
are part of the ruling elite.’ Due to Iran’s influence over Iraqi politics, the ‘protesters accuse Iran 
of complicity in what they see as Iraq’s governance failure and corruption’, the BBC reported 
(28 November 2019). Similarly, on 21 December 2019 the NY Times reported that the Iraqi 
demonstrators ‘demand the ousting of the government, an end to corruption and a halt to the 
overweening influence of Iran….the protesters’ focus reflects their frustration with the govern-
ment’s failure to foster economic opportunity or deal with entrenched corruption.’ The Guardian 
(28 November 2019) too emphasised the link with Tehran, describing the events as ‘the uprising 
against the Tehran-backed authorities’. 
This is the line presented by the US officials too. The U.S. stressed its concerns over the 
deaths of protesters in Iraq on 10 November in a White House statement: ‘Iraqis won’t stand 
by as the Iranian regime drains their resources’. Washington blacklisted three Iran-backed Iraqi 
paramilitary leaders over their alleged role in killings of anti-government protesters in Iraq and 
threatened future sanctions. Senior U.S. Treasury officials said ‘Iraqis have a fundamental right 
to a political process that is free from foreign malign influence and the corruption that both 
comes with it and fuels it’, reported by the Reuters on 6 December 2019.
The impact of the Arab Spring
As many analysts have pointed out, the overwhelming motivations of the people who took 
to the streets in Iraq were the low standards of living, dismal economic and employment con-
ditions, in particular high unemployment among the young people, inefficient welfare state and 
food shortages. All these are similar to the conditions of those countries that witnessed serious 
protest movements in the early 2010s, the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ countries - Tunisia, Egypt, 
Libya, Syria and others. What has been less adequately reported is that all these countries in 
the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) experienced an intense economic transformation, 
imposed by the IMF and the World Bank, during the previous couple of decades, away from the 
state-command economy model of ‘Arab Socialism’ of the 1960s and 70s, and towards mar-
ket-dominated neoliberal capitalism in the 1980s and 90s. Through the guidance and assistance 
of the IMF and the World Bank, the MENA region pursued neoliberal economic policies (entre-
preneurial freedom, strong property rights, free markets, and free trade) which led to great 
income inequalities and a concentration of wealth among the small political elite and its cronies.
The ‘Arab Spring’ uprisings took place within the conditions of sharply increased poverty, 
very high youth unemployment and lack of opportunities for young people. Youth unemployment 
was over 30 percent everywhere in the region, and in Syria and Jordan young people under the 
age of 30 constitute more than 70 percent of the unemployed workforce. In the whole MENA re-
gion there was, and still is, a vivid mismatch between demography and economic structure: while 
demography is evolving, the economic structure is totally unresponsive to the needs of growing 
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populations. The harsh neoliberal policies of the 1990s and 2000s made the situation worse, 
much worse, rather than improve the economy and provide solutions. The most obvious common 
feature of the principal storm centres – Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria – was far-reaching pro-
gram of neo-liberal restructuring, which was directed by the IMF and put into practice quickly 
by the regimes, with similar devastating results. These included privatisation of almost all state 
owned enterprises, mass poverty, large scale unemployment, in particular growing youth unem-
ployment, the lack of opportunities for university and college graduates, falling real wages and 
the accumulation of vast amounts of wealth in the hands of the country’s top ruling families. 
In Egypt, for instance, the World Bank and the IMF prescribed extensive neoliberal policies 
since 1991. By the mid-2000s, more than a decade and a half neoliberal reforms brought the 
Egyptian society on the brink of a deep social crisis. In line with the Economic Reform and 
Structural Adjustment Programme signed with the IMF in 1991, the public sector in Egypt was 
steadily privatised, and prices and rents liberalised (and increased sharply). By 2005, 209 of the 
314 public sector companies had been sold either wholly or in part, which was accompanied by 
massive lay-offs, and created extreme insecurity for those who were lucky enough to keep their 
jobs. Labour unrest increased from 2005 onwards, while high food prices and high inflation add-
ed to the suffering of the majority of people, as the businesses were celebrating positive growth 
rates and increased profit margins. The World Bank (2019) reports show that ‘some 60 percent 
of Egypt’s population is either poor or vulnerable, and inequality is on the rise’. Egypt’s economy 
was ruined largely by a combination of the self-destructive policies of its regime and neoliberal 
policies imposed by the global financial bodies. The country’s economy suffered disastrously 
under an IMF and World Bank-imposed restructuring process.
The same course took place in Tunisia, Libya, Syria and other countries in the region. These 
countries all started taking direct advice and loans from the IMF, the World Bank and bond 
markets in the 1990s, and since then their autocratic rulers had been consistently praised by 
these global agencies of neoliberalism, as well as the governments of the US, France and Britain. 
Iraq, however, is a different story, in the sense that an exceptionally harsh neoliberal re-
structuring was introduced by a military invasion, led by the US army, in the most brutal and 
boldest way ever seen in the world. The 2003 invasion of Iraq, led by the Bush administration 
in the US, turned Iraq into a neoliberal utopia. When Saddam Hussein’s regime was defeated 
and replaced by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), headed by Paul Bremer, a series of 
extensive neoliberal measures were quickly introduced in its first month without any waiting 
period, from privatisation of 200 Iraqi state-owned companies to reducing corporate tax from 
45 percent to 15 percent, and from allowing foreign firms to retain 100 percent of their Iraqi 
assets to a complete restructuring the Iraqi banking system. Iraq’s oil revenues were put in a 
US-dominated development fund, the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI), held in an account at the 
Federal Reserve in New York and used for restructuring expenditure. According to a US govern-
ment appointed audit’s reports to the US Congress in 2004, 2005 and 2006, Special Inspector 
General for Iraqi Reconstruction (SIGIR), there was poor delivery of contracts, overcharging, em-
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bezzlement, and general fraud by private contractors, and $8.8 billion of the $23 billion money 
held at DFI account remains unaccounted for (GPF, 2019).
‘A Capitalist Dream’: Security in the aftermath of the invasion
The Coalition Provisional Authority ran the occupation regime during its first 14 months and 
directed the most extreme version of neoliberal restructuring put in practice ever in the world, 
enforcing the market as the organising and regulative principle of the state and society. Even 
the IMF (2003) was alarmed and advised a more cautious approach. In less than 14 months, 
Paul Bremer issued 26 orders, as a result of which the Iraqi state was deprived of economic 
sovereignty and control of its own affairs. More than half a million Iraqi citizens abruptly lost 
their jobs, after which over 50 percent of the workforce became unemployed. All these extensive 
neoliberal ‘shock programme of economic reforms’ were described by the Economist (2003) in 
September 2003 as a ‘Capitalist Dream’. 
When the war started the economy of Iraq had already been in deep trouble, following the 
eight-year-long war against Iran in the 1980s, the first Gulf War of 1990-91, and UN imposed 
financial and trade embargo on Iraq since 1990. On top of this, after the invasion, the Coali-
tion Provisional Authority paid large sums of compensation from the Iraqi public sources to a 
number of international corporations, ostensibly as compensations for ‘lost profits’ or ‘decline 
of business’ due to Saddam Hussein’s aggressive behaviour in the region since 1990. Sheraton 
received $11 million, Bechtel $7 million, Pepsi $3.8 million, Mobil $2.3 million, Kentucky Fried 
Chicken [[ $321,000 and Toys R Us $190,000 – all US-based enterprises. Israeli farmers received 
$8 million, supposedly because they were not able to harvest fully due to the threat from Sadd-
am’s regime, and Israeli hoteliers and travel agencies received $15 million. A detailed account of 
these compensations were given by Eric Herring and Glen Rangwala (2006). 
During the first year of the occupation, about $50 billion of reconstruction contracts were 
commissioned to various US corporations, including Halliburton, Bechtel, SkylinkUSA, Steve-
doring Services of America, and BearingPoint. During the same period, only 2 percent of the 
contracts were given to Iraqi firms. Research by the Financial Times showed in 2013 that the 
top 10 American and foreign contractors in Iraq have secured business worth at least $72 bil-
lion between them. David Whyte (2007) describes this economic performance of the Coalition 
Provisional Authority as ‘one of the most audacious and spectacular crimes of theft in modern 
history. … The suspension of the normal rule of law by the occupying powers, in turn, encouraged 
Coalition Provisional Authority tolerance of, and participation in, the theft of public funds in Iraq. 
State-corporate criminality in the case of occupied Iraq must therefore be understood as part of 
a wider strategy of political and economic domination’. 
The war in Iraq officially ended in 2011, when President Obama declared the withdrawal of 
the troops in October and the last US soldiers left Iraq on 18 December. What was left behind, 
however, a deeply traumatized country with a totally bankrupt economy. According to the UN, 
seven million Iraqis were living below the poverty line. One in five of young men and significant-
ly more young women under 24 are unemployed, in a country where almost 60 percent of the 
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population is under 24. The draconian measures undertaken after the 2003 invasion left behind 
a seriously weakened Iraq in every sense. A large amount of Iraqi money was paid to US contrac-
tors to implement local projects, many of them never finished, drowned in a sea of bureaucracy, 
corruption and open theft. No one knew how many such contractors were hired and how much 
money were paid to them for the tasks, many of which remained incomplete. In 2009, there were 
about 13.000 contractors employed by US agencies (Schwartz , 2011). 
Iraq has experienced several parliamentary elections since the invasion, the first one in 
2005 and the latest in 2018. At least fifteen PMs came to power representing different political 
parties/coalitions. None of them, however, managed to satisfy the serious and rightful demands 
of the Iraqi people: ending corruption, increasing living standards, creating jobs and opportuni-
ties for increasing number of young educated people, providing security, and proper funding for 
the services. There are, of course, many local reasons for this failure, from increasing security 
concerns to the violent civil war in next door Syria, and to longstanding divisions of the country 
along ethnic and religious lines. However, the desperate state of the economy, lack of oppor-
tunities for the local people, sharply increased corruption as a result of contracting system put 
in place by the US pro-Consul Bremer contributed to the miserable state of affairs seriously. At 
times these different factors converge, and at times they pull against each other, but the state 
of the economy has remained as the most significant context and the obstacle for any Iraqi 
government to deal with the serious problems of the country. Successive Iraqi governments pur-
sued the project of neoliberal transformation of Iraq, sometimes willingly, but mostly reluctantly 
and as a result of already tightly established links with the IMF and global financial institutions 
through loans and debt rescheduling. Iraq’s debt was restructured on terms that made the 
country subject to fully applying IMF austerity policies, even after the occupation ended offi-
cially in 2011. In 2006, for instance, the government accepted ‘fuel liberalisation programme’, 
following the IMF recommendations, that was basically cutting off all subsidies of fuel and gas 
products, which resulted in a sudden explosion of prices of fuel and gas-related items. The bold 
neoliberal move by Coalition Provisional Authority following the invasion in 2003, reinforcement 
of macro-economic stabilisation, cuts in government expenditures, ending state subsidies, and 
the opening up of the Iraqi economy to foreign investment by selling State-Owned Enterprises, 
have had dire consequences for the people of Iraq. All these bold neoliberal measures contribut-
ed directly to produce a dystopian economy and a failed state, incapable of controlling its own 
affairs. 
‘Liberating’ the Iraqis: the failures of democracy and a western style system
 ‘The battle of peace has to be fought on two fronts’, declared Edward Stettinius Jr., US Sec-
retary of State in June 1945 (Grimm 2004). ‘The first is the security where victory spells freedom 
from fear. The second is the economic and social front where victory means freedom from want. 
Only victory on both fronts can assure the world of an enduring peace’. It was very much in the 
spirit of the UN, the spirit of cooperation to work towards peace and prosperity. It was only 
under those conditions, of peace and prosperity, that security was going to be achieved, in any 
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country, in any community, in any area of human life. Security was to be understood in terms of 
freedom from want (prosperity) and freedom from fear (peace).
While the invasion of Iraq was 16 years ago, the post-invasion war in Iraq continues to this 
day. Even the war’s quietest months have been punctuated by moments of mass horror, and 
barely a day has passed without reports of civilians being shot or blown up. Despite any number 
of official declarations, there has been no ‘turning point’ towards peace, no ‘mission accom-
plished’ for ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’. 
An entire generation of Iraqi children has known little other than life in a country riven 
by violence, fear, hopelessness, internal displacement and poverty. All around them, the war’s 
fearful legacy persists. ‘We Want a True Homeland’, shouted the young protesters this year. It is 
common for those living outside it to see Iraq as a country of violence, of war and of constant 
upheaval; a country where the West has ‘tried and failed’ to provide security; as a country of 
terror, of ISIS, of human rights abuses and tribal conflict. Others may see it as a developing de-
mocracy, or a budding Western-style economy trying to bloom in a barren, unstable region. It is 
common for us living outside it to forget that this ‘trial and error’ state is also the homeland of 
millions of people. The invasion in 2003 was supported by, among others, those who saw a great 
opportunity for Iraq to be ‘reconstructed’. The invading coalition was going to help.
On 6 April 2003, while Iraq was still under attack from coalition forces, Deputy Defense 
Secretary Paul Wolfowitz stated, ‘There has got to be an effective administration from day one. 
People need water and food and medicine, and the sewers have to work, the electricity has to 
work. And that’s a coalition responsibility’. By the time the Iraqi people had a say in choosing 
a government, three years later, the key economic and political decisions about their country’s 
future had been made by their occupiers. 
American and British plans for Iraq’s future economy went beyond ‘reconstruction’. The 
emerging state was going to be treated ‘as a blank slate on which the most ideological Wash-
ington neoliberals can design their dream economy: fully privatized, foreign-owned and open for 
business’ (Klein, 10 April 2003). Those whose homeland it was, the Iraqi public, were absent from 
these decisions. Without any democratic process, the ‘charity’, the ‘gift’ of liberal and democratic 
Western states was barely disguised exploitation. In the name of that ‘democratic’ dream of a 
privatised, foreign-owned and ‘reconstructed’ Iraq, hundreds of thousands of Iraqi civilians have 
lost their lives.
As Iraq was being bombed by the coalition, in April 2003 Klein predicted:
‘A people, starved and sickened by sanctions, then pulverized by war, is going to emerge from this 
trauma to find that their country has been sold out from under them. They will also discover that 
their newfound “freedom”–for which so many of their loved ones perished–comes pre-shackled 
with irreversible economic decisions that were made in boardrooms while the bombs were still 
falling. They will then be told to vote for their new leaders, and welcomed to the wonderful world 
of democracy.’
17 years later, we see the complete breakdown of trust in the political system; we see cor-
ruption, brutality and violence. Protesters carrying the Iraqi flag are demanding their homeland, 
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as their government violates and abuses their human rights, as security forces and anti-riot 
police open fire using live ammunition and tear gas. As their ‘democratic government’ fails to 
provide opportunities, social, health and educational safeguards for its children. As, like every 
one of its governments since 2006, it continues to fail to provide its people with any kind of 
security.
Security does not simply involve and is not limited to physical attacks resulting in death or 
injury. That ‘only’ 2,337 civilians were killed this year, compared to 3,300 civilians killed the year 
before and 13,000 the year before that, does not mean that Iraq is now safer, or more secure. 
It does so only in a very narrow understanding of security. However, security is a much broader 
concept or category that includes a commitment to human rights, justice, prosperity and the 
creation of political, social, environmental, economic and cultural systems that are the building 
blocks of survival, livelihood and human dignity. In a state rife with injustice, poverty, violations 
of human rights, government brutality and continuous foreign intervention, there can be no 
security. There can also be no democracy.
However, Iraq’s devastation was not unpredictable. The neoliberal democratic system that 
was imposed on the country could not have produced a ‘Western-style democracy’, or the out-
comes expected in a developed nation. Highly developed nations face no real threat of major 
war and enjoy economic prosperity, comparatively low levels of crime, and enduring political and 
social stability. Despite warnings to the contrary by our security services, even the threat of ter-
rorism is minor. Iraq, on the other hand, was and still is a weak state. Between 2003 and 2020 
the only constants have been the following: communal violence, terrorism, poverty, weapons 
proliferation, crime, political instability, social breakdown, riots, disorder and economic failure. 
In Iraq we observe the lack of basic security that exists in ‘zones of instability’, where Iraq, after 
17 years of ‘reconstruction’, still remains. Iraq has now become the perfect example of physical, 
political and economic insecurity, destroyed by its purported saviours.
As in all weak states, the primary security threats facing the Iraqi population originate not 
only from external sources, but also from internal, domestic sources. In such states, the more 
the ruling elites try to establish effective state rule, the more they provoke insurgency. Despite 
it being declared a democracy, Iraq lacks regime security, in all aspects of the term (health 
and safety, law and order, and economic security). In Iraq and other ‘liberated and democra-
tised’ states those internal/domestic security threats have gone hand-in-hand with the external 
threat posed by a collaborative external actor and the neoliberal destruction it brought to the 
country. 
It was thought –even promised- that an Iraq free of its dictator would become a strong 
state. A democratic, liberal state, much like those in the developed world. However, Iraq has 
become a state even weaker, much weaker and less secure, than it was under Saddam Hussein’s 
iron rule. The continuing protests in Iraq and the killing of protesters in their hundreds by gov-
ernment forces, combined with a persisting insurgency, demonstrate the lack of identification of 
the population with ‘the state’. What we see contributing to this weakness is the new colonialism 
masking as political and economic development, through the principle and the process of global-
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isation. Neoliberal ideology has been promoted to the developing world by the chief advocates of 
globalisation, the IMF and the World Bank, through their liberalisation programme. As a result, 
Iraq’s economic development consists of a rentier economy in parallel to and within a neoliberal 
model. J.M. Keynes reportedly said in the 1930s, ‘Laissez-faire capitalism is the absurd idea that 
the worst people, for the worst reasons, will do what is best for all of us’.
‘Many of the region’s pathologies—including unemployment, a bloated state, a weak private 
sector or limited political evolution—are ultimately rooted in an economic structure heavily reli-
ant on external windfalls, whether derived from oil, aid or remittances’ (Adeel, 2017). The ‘rentier 
state paradigm’ has become ‘a common tool in the interpretation of the political dynamics of 
oil-producing countries’ (Luciani, 2019, p. 121). ‘Resource-rich societies are systematically con-
demned to having underdeveloped political structures. (…) The principal function of a rentier 
state is the allocation or distribution of rents, which tilts incentives away from production to 
predation, stifling competitive structural change that could otherwise have produced a social 
structure more favourable to democratisation’ (Adeel, 2017). Oil wealth has allowed states to 
create new economic elites and shape a non-democratic state–society relationship. The diffi-
culty of establishing representative democracy and democratic institutions in a rentier state is 
demonstrated in Iraq.
Hegemony and globalization
The process of globalisation is not some benign inevitable consequence of modernization, 
but a designed aspect of the process of hegemony. ‘Through the systematic control by the US 
government and multinationals of globalising actors, such as the Bretton Woods institutions, 
communications and travel technology advancements, and the advancement of the neoliberal 
order,(…) the United States has been able to effectively build structures that perpetuate its own 
dominance’ (Skerritt, 2019). In addition, through a process of macro-securitisation, relationships, 
agendas and security dynamics have been consolidated. Globalisation coupled with a universal-
ist narrative, western born and universally imposed, have constructed a neoliberal system of 
economic and ideological dominance, with clearly defined threats to it, regionally and globally. It 
is those security threats the War on Terror was designed to fight and eliminate, based on, as well 
as through, the neoliberal, universalist narrative of a hegemonic social, political and economic 
culture. Thus was achieved the implementation of policies and procedures, ideas and cultures, 
that promote the structures and ideologies that will maintain hegemony. Gramsci argued that a 
key factor in achieving hegemony is to convince others that your preferences are their own. In 
Iraq this has met with partial success; where it has been unsuccessful, it has resulted in death, 
destruction and a long war.
The American hegemonic state, a truly global imperial power, was in a position at the end 
of the Second World War to master primacy in the global economic system under its single im-
perial-hegemonic design. The USA first established itself in Central and Latin America and then 
followed an Open Door imperialist policy in Eurasia and other parts of the globe, first through 
the Bretton Woods arrangements and then for the late 1970s onwards through neoliberal glo-
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balization. This system, however, rests on a heavily hierarchical structure, both in terms of class 
and in terms of administrative/ institutional divisions. There can be no capitalist globalization 
without these hierarchies (states, aggregation of geopolitical blocs, class divisions, separation 
of state and civil society). As a result of this hierarchical structure, the major beneficiaries of 
neoliberal globalisation are large trans-national corporations and wealthy investors based in the 
Western states. Neoliberalism has been a disaster for the peoples of the developing countries, 
including Iraq and other MENA countries. Although seemingly neutral, the major institutions of 
neoliberal globalisation, the IMF and World Bank, both emerged from the Bretton Woods con-
ference, in practice end up serving powerful interests of western countries. 
‘[W]hoever controls the Middle East controls the global oil spigot and whoever controls the 
global oil spigot can control the global economy, at least for the near future’. (Harvey 2005, p. 
19) This is how David Harvey summarises the importance of the oil-rich region of the Middle East 
for the US global hegemony. Throughout recent history, the oil-rich regions of the Middle East 
have played a key role in determining US foreign policy, This is simply because the Middle East-
ern oil regions currently account for 65 per cent of the world’s proven oil reserves, and 30 per 
cent of its day-to-day production, and therefore the Middle East has been the geographic centre 
of gravity of the world oil industry (Renner 2003). They are therefore a truly vital strategic US 
interest. Since the new and bountiful discoveries of cheaper oil in the Persian Gulf just after 
the Second World War, oil from the Middle East has gradually come to displace US oil. Without 
direct and secure access to this resource, the world economy would fall into a very serious crisis, 
and the position of the leading power, the US, would be dealt a mortal blow. In order to continue 
growing, the US-dominated world capitalist economy needs plenty of cheap and readily available 
oil. The Middle East supplied 22 per cent of US oil imports, 36 per cent of OECD Europe’s, 40 
per cent of China’s, 60 per cent of India’s, and 80 per cent of Japan’s and South Korea’s in 2006 
(Energy Information Administration Annual Energy Review 2006). 
But this dimension cannot be reduced solely to matters of economic prosperity, even though 
it represents a part. Above all, the oil dimension in US foreign policy is a strategic one which 
mainly concerns exercising global power, a central part of US global hegemony. The purpose of 
this essay is to seek some understanding of how and why the oil of the Middle East came to play 
a central role in the rise and continuation of the hegemonic position of the US.
When a hegemonic power imposes its political and economic authority over a region, it does 
so in relation to its allies and its local protégés. Gramsci used the term ‘hegemony’ to signify 
that the dominant power leads the system in a direction that not only serves the dominant 
group’s interests but is also perceived by subordinate groups as serving a more general inter-
est (Gramsci 1971: 106–120, 161). Harvey’s usage of the term is similar: ‘the particular mix of 
coercion and consent embedded in the exercise of political power’ (Harvey, 2005: 36). US ally 
Japan and West European economies are dependent on oil imports from the Middle East, and US 
protégés in that region, the oil monarchies, require US protection and military and political sup-
port. Through its influence over the oil-rich regimes in the region, the US has consolidated its 
strategic presence in the Middle East by effectively controlling the ‘global oil spigot’. This seems 
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also an effective way to ward off any competition for top position in the global hierarchy as all 
its competitors are heavily dependent on this essential source, oil, coming from the Middle East.
The question of US influence over Middle Eastern oil-rich countries has become increas-
ingly important since the Second World War. Between 1940 and 1967, US companies increased 
their control of Middle Eastern oil from a mere 10 per cent to over 60 per cent. (Monthly Re-
view 2002). The so-called ‘Carter Doctrine’ of January 1980 perhaps symbolises this heightened 
significance of the region’s oil for the US state more than anything else: ‘Let our position be 
absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will 
be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an 
assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force’ (given in Klare 2004: 
45–47). President Jimmy Carter, in his annual State of the Union Address to Congress, also 
reiterated his plans to increase military spending by 5 per cent, with special emphasis on devel-
oping a 100,000-man ‘rapid deployment force’ capable of intervention in the region. President 
Carter himself did not use the term ‘Carter Doctrine’ to refer to his policies in the Middle East 
in any public statement during his term in office. However, the label was used later in official US 
documents (see Meiertons 2010).
More than 30 years have passed since the first expression of the Carter Doctrine, and the 
significance of the oil-rich Middle East for the global position of the US remains as one of the 
central pillars of world politics. It ensures, with the use of violence if necessary, that Middle 
Eastern oil remains accessible, free-flowing, cheap, and under US control. 
The politicisation and concentration in the Middle East of the oil business went hand in 
glove with the region’s commercialisation, privatisation, and concentration of the global arms 
trade. In the 1950s, some 95 per cent of US armament exports had been provided as foreign 
aid, whereas by 1980 the foreign aid as armaments had fallen to 45 per cent and by 2000 to 
less than 25 per cent. From the early 1970s onwards, when the petrodollar became an essential 
dimension of the US global hegemony. US defence production experienced a high degree of 
privatisation and internationalisation, followed by an unprecedented degree of mergers, acquisi-
tions, and consolidations according to the pattern of ‘new multinational corporations’. From the 
early 1970s onwards, the Middle East became the world’s chief importer of weaponry, taking the 
lead from South-East Asia. In this way, a large amount of that oil income, petrodollars, started 
to be spent on buying armaments and hence turned into weapon dollars. Tensions in the region, 
in particular the escalation of Arab-Israeli conflict, created the necessary conditions for a type 
of dollar recycling based on arms trade. Since the 1940s, the role of the Middle East in world 
accumulation had been intimately linked to oil exports, and from the 1970s onwards, this trade 
became the basis of the petrodollar system, which was then accompanied by another dimension: 
turning a large amount of this oil income into weapon dollars (Nitzan and Bichler 2002, p. 25). 
These two flows provided a powerful new lease of life for the US economy, inasmuch as their 
combination was associated with the generation of substantial profits for the US arms manufac-
turing industry, American-British giant oil companies, and of course the US Department of the 
Treasury. Most importantly, these two flows (oil going out, and weapons coming in) were dolla-
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rised. Thus, for example, in 1974, Saudi Arabia’s arms imports were worth $2.6 billion, whereas 
between 1985 and 1992 this figure increased ten times and reached $25.4 billion. Throughout 
the 1970s and 1980s, the US increased its arms sales to Middle Eastern states, in particular 
during the Iraq-Iran war of 1980–88. The amount of arms sales to the region reached its peak in 
1988 when ‘the Administration suggested increasing US arms exports by $3.3 billion, to a level 
exceeding $15 billion – with proposed shipments worth $3.6 billion to Israel, $2.7 billion to Egypt, 
4950 million to Saudi Arabia, and $1.3 billion to other Middle Eastern countries’ (Nitzan and 
Bichler 2002, p. 261). Sharply intensified armed conflict and quickly rising tensions in the Gulf 
region and (with the end of the Cold War) Central Asia and North Africa, including the Pakistani/
Indian conflict, meant much greater US military involvement in the region, and greater consol-
idation of the alliance between US arms manufacturing/weapons trade and energy interests. 
Since the end of the Cold War, the US has waged four wars in the region (two in Iraq, one 
in Afghanistan, and one in Libya) and is currently threatening more. Each conflict has of course 
its own specific reasons related to local conditions. However, there is a common denominator: 
the need to keep the oil of the region ample and inexpensive, and most importantly, under firm 
US control, so that the US-led system of global capitalist economies can continue to grow. US 
strategists do not simply want to obtain oil, which is a simple matter if one has money. They also 
want to eliminate all potential competitors, safeguarding the region politically and militarily so 
that the flow of oil from the Middle East to world markets can happen under its direct control.
In the Middle East, control of the region’s oil resources, keeping the US dollar as the only 
currency used in the world oil trade, and using these effectively to prevent any challenge to the 
hegemonic position of the US are all interlinked and cannot be separated from each other. On 
22 March 2003, at the beginning of the US-led war against Iraq, General Tommy Franks, chief 
commander of the US forces in Iraq, was explaining one of the key objectives of the Operation 
Iraqi Freedom as ‘to secure Iraq’s oil fields and resources’ (CNN.com 2003). Securing US inter-
ests regarding the oil resources of the Middle East is not as simple as just going and militarily 
capturing key positions of a country. Political events since 2001 have clearly demonstrated that 
superior military forces of the US and its Western allies may take but cannot hold Iraq’s, Libya’s, 
or other Middle Eastern countries’ oil. Far from staving off the downfall of the US economic 
and financial hegemony, the continuing military aggression and arrogance of the US state may 
instead push the regional powers to distance themselves from its strategic goals. Member 
countries of OPEC, for instance, have sharply increased deposits in other currencies including 
the euro and the Japanese yen, and placed less in dollars starting from 2001 and the Afghan 
War. OPEC members cut the proportion of deposits held in dollars from 75 per cent in the third 
quarter of 2001 to 61.5 per cent. US dollar-denominated deposits fell from 75 percent of total 
deposits in the third quarter of 2001 to 61.5 percent in the last quarter of 2004. During the 
same period, the share of euro-denominated deposits rose from 12 per cent to 20 per cent (FT.
com 2004).
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The structural violence of neoliberalism
The term ‘structural violence’ was introduced by Johan Galtung in his article ‘Violence, Peace, 
and Peace Research’ (1969). It refers to a form of violence wherein some social structure may 
harm people by preventing them from meeting their basic needs. Structural violence, he argues, 
is an “avoidable impairment of fundamental human needs” linked to social injustice, political, 
economic, cultural or legal limitations. It is the result of a power system wherein structures 
cause harm: people are mal-developed or killed by poverty, unjust social, political and economic 
institutions. Like armed violence, it can kill, but also cause physical, social and psychological 
damage. Structural violence and direct violence are said to be highly interdependent, in a con-
text of dramatic inequality, including gender inequality, poverty, hate crimes, racism, police 
violence, state violence, terrorism and war. The structural violence of the neoliberal system 
resulted in all of the above, in Iraq and in other Middle Eastern states.
‘The failure to make the security of Iraqis a priority; the initial imposition of a puppet gov-
ernment of mostly exiles without popular bases in Iraq; the mass unemployment inflicted by 
the dissolution of the army and purge of the bureaucracy; the halving of GNP/capita compared 
to 2001; the flooding of the country with foreign mercenaries and contractors; the near-ab-
sence of post-war reconstruction (…) the expenditure of reconstruction money outside Iraq or 
its dissipation through massive corruption, war profiteering and enormous salaries for foreign 
contractors’, as well as the privatisation and selling off of ‘Iraq’s oil assets to Western buyers’ 
created grievances, opposition and mobilisation that took the form of and resulted in insurgen-
cy, terrorism and Balkanisation (Hinnebusch, 2015, p. 263). The violence of the system linked to 
social and economic injustice, physical and psychological trauma, created the insurgency, count-
er-insurgency, fragmentation and daily criminal violence that has led to the loss of hundreds 
of thousands of civilian lives and insecurity in all sectors: food security, health, community, 
economic, political and personal security.
Globalisation was expected by some to transform states, by putting an end to ‘realist dynam-
ics at the system level by spreading the “zone of peace” to the region’ (Hinnebusch, 2015, p. 173). 
This may have been a realistic expectation, had peace been at the heart of Western policies in 
the region. Instead, the oil reserves of the Gulf have been the main stake in these wars, not only 
for the hegemon, but for the economic health of the world capitalist economy. And, as predicted, 
neoliberalism has fostered inequality; a growing unemployment that has gone hand in hand with 
poverty and mass migration. Globalisation makes security interdependent; terrorism, gun crime 
and illegal migration are spill over effects of structural, political and economic insecurity in the 
developing world. Iraq today shows how globalisation incites rebellion and radicalisation. The 
advancement of the neoliberal agenda by industrialised states through globalisation has failed 
to deliver the economic stability and growth it promised. Instead, globalisation continues to 
increase the gap between rich and poor, between and within states. Ultimately, inequality is the 
biggest threat to global security.
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